Levinas and Heidegger: On the ‘Others’ By: Christopher P. Satoor

I thought I would submit to you all my work on Levinas and Heidegger, this is a solid critque of the Heideggerian system.  Trully it is an attempt on Levinas's behalf to re-counter Ontology.

This paper is an enquiry into the two philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas. Both are writing on and concerned with the relationship between beings and the ‘other.’ The following paper will be an investigation of both these philosophers’ theories. For Heidegger, his search begins with a question of who these others are. Since Da-sein is a being and a being-in-the-world, this being-in-the-world is also a being-with-one-another. The others for Heidegger are the ‘they.’ According to Heidegger, everyone is the other. No one or any person are truly themselves; everyone is the ‘they,’ and everyone has already surrendered themselves to the ‘they’ (Heidegger p.120). The ‘they’ are an elusive transparency, which Heidegger calls the ‘Neuter’ (Heidegger p.119). Being-with-others to Heidegger, is a part of Da-sein’s absorption into the everydayness of the ‘they’ (Heidegger p.119). This everydayness in turn masks Da-sein’s -own most- possibilities into the they’s averageness (Heidegger p.118). According to Heidegger, Da-sein as being-in-the-world, shares a publicness with the ‘they’ and in a sense this publicness makes Da-sein comprehend itself in the others (Heidegger p.119).  Levinas has a different view of otherness and the other.

Before addressing the other, Levinas feels that the history of philosophy is flawed. According to Levinas, the flaw in philosophy is accepting the vast notion of universality through a third term (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). The reason why Levinas has such a problem with the concept of universality is that it diminishes the individual into an immeasurable totality. Like Heidegger, Levinas uses the word absorbed. Being absorbed means being swallowed whole, into the totality. This is a vanishing of our unique differences (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). In a sense, we all become the same. The next move will be different from Heidegger. Levinas will attempt to save the individual’s singularity (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th).

To save this unique singularity, Levinas needs to stop erroneous philosophies that encompass a synthesis of self into the other. The individual, ‘I,’ must be separated from the other (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). This separation helps bring back the singularity to the “I”. Levinas will state that once this separation is complete there must be a relationship between this “I” and the other (Lecture not from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). This relationship is spawned through the concept of infinity. Levinas states “If totality can not be constituted, it is because infinity does not permit itself to be integrated” (Levinas p.80). According to Levinas, existing as separated is necessitated by having the idea of infinity (Levinas p.80).

Levinas wants us to realize that the true idea of infinity is found in discourse and this association is “…an ethical relation” (Levinas p.80). Already we can start to see the difference between Levinas and Heidegger. Levinas has portrayed philosophy as dangerous and violent, and stresses the need of individuality by separating oneself and engaging in a relationship with the other. Levinas has put more pressure on the level of responsibility to the other. We become, in a sense, more responsible when we engage in an ‘ethical relation’ with the other (Levinas p.80).

Jacques Derrida, a student of Levinas, and also a scholar in the works of both Heidegger and Levinas sums up the relation between both of these philosophers as follows: 

“Levinas wants to remind us that responsibility is not at first responsibility of myself, for myself; that the sameness of myself is derived from the perspective of the other, as if it were second to the other, coming to itself as responsible and moral from the position of my responsibility before the other”(Derrida p.47).

This idea of responsibility is quite different from Heidegger’s case. The idea of responsibility is portrayed in Da-sein’s constitution, which is ‘care.’ As a being with being, Da-sein has concern; however, this concern is not for the other; this concern is for itself or Da-sein’s ‘own most’ possibilities. Heidegger states:


“Da-sein is a being which is concerned in its being about that being. The ‘is’ concerned about…has become clearer in the constitution of being of understanding as a self-projective being towards its ‘own most’ potentiality-for-being” (Heidegger p.179). 

Heidegger’s call to conscience is that of a call to care. The concerned Da-sein has care for itself and not for an other. Da-sein feel’s guilty or lost in ‘the they’ and must return to its true authentic self. Levinas would find fault in Heidegger’s methodology for these reasons. It is important to Levinas to encounter the other not to flee from it. In this relationship -face-to-face- I do not know the other, but when the other and I engage in an ethical relation, language is the key to communicating with the other. Each encompasses infinity in this face-to-face encounter. Levinas states:
 

“This conjuncture is irreducible to totality; the ‘face to face’ position is not a modification of the ‘along side of…Even when I shall have linked the ‘other’ to myself with the conjuncture ‘and’ the ‘other’ continues to face me, to reveal himself in his face…the face to face remains an ultimate situation” (Levinas p.80).


These relations with the other are a result of ‘reason,’ ‘language’ and ‘universality’ (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). Levinas’ goal here is that by engaging in relationships with the other, equality is found through the encounter. This promotes equality among all others as well (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). This equality promotes what I had mentioned previously regarding the responsibility for the other; the I is responsible for the other and that other and so on (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th).

This is a crucial difference between Heidegger and Levinas; Heidegger stresses the importance on being and makes this concept of being more exclusive than beings and existents (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). It is by stressing being over existents, where Levinas sees us losing our face; there is no encounter with the other; the other is reduced to an impersonal character and Levinas feels this is unjust. (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). Levinas states: 

“Language is not enacted within a consciousness; it comes to me from the other and reverberates in consciousness by putting it into question” (Levinas p 206). 

There is a certain meaning by engaging in this face to face relationship; it is a primordial fact, according to Levinas, which lies in language (Levinas p.206). The face is the first primary signification and the first sign to existence (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). This signification occurs in being with language, because language becomes the true essence involved in the relation of the other. Heidegger talks of language as well; however, he calls true language discourse. All other language is found in the they. The they speak language through ‘idle talk’ disguise the true meaning of language (Heidegger p.158).This is described by Heidegger as 

“…a mode of being of the uprooted understanding of Da-sein (Heidegger p.159). Heidegger also calls it chatter. It is disguised in newspapers and magazines. It is the talk that covers over the realm of intelligibility and promotes an ambiguity" (Heidegger p.160). 

The question is if ‘the they’ are responsible for this negative encounter with language then how is it possible to obtain a truly authentic experience with the other or anyone at all? This is completely different to what Levinas has conceptualized it as; he explains how we see that language aids in the face to face encounter, which adds to the signification of real being.  Levinas finds it quite weird why Heidegger’s Da-sein doesn’t take part in food consumption, and this is a good point. Nowhere in Being in Time, does Heidegger even bring up the notion of nutrition. It’s not any real part of Da-sein’s horizons. 

Heidegger’s notion of equipment -or tools- is that there is an understanding; when I pick up the hammer and nails, I already understand the tools that I am holding as ‘ready-to-hand.’ Levinas finds fault with this; he feels that there has to be a mode of pleasure in the action; this pleasure is invoked before I pick up the hammer and nails. There must be a pre-mode of pleasure for me to be hammering the nail into the piece of wood. Do I enjoy this? Did I want to hammer this nail into the wood? Now Heidegger is simply stating that as a being-in-the-world, we are accustomed to the equipment around us; therefore, we have an appropriate understanding of the ready-to-hand objects or tools (Heidegger p.53). 

One of the most crucial points that Levinas articulates, is the notion of being reduced. No one or person should ever be reduced to the same. Levinas states: “To kill is not to dominate, but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes power. It is still a power, for the face expresses itself in the sensible, but already impotency, because the face rends the sensible” (Levinas p.198). Levinas is stating that this is as a descriptive fact that no one can ever be reduced to oneself. The murderer, by killing the individual, is thus invoking their wrath and reducing the other to the notion of the same. Professor Mark Cauchi gave us the example of the commandment in the bible, “Thou shall not Kill” and in comparison to this commandment there is a level of responsibility that we have for the other; we don’t take the lives of the many; so in retrospective, “Thou shall not kill” is really to Levinas “Thou shall not reduce the other to that of the same” (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). Levinas wants us to realize that we need our simple relations with these others; they open the doors to a world of reason, language and universality (Lecture notes from Professor Mark Cauchi on Thursday April 4th). 

In this paper I have presented the claims of both Heidegger and Levinas; however, I feel that Levinas has stressed more ethics than being; Heidegger’s great Ontology is profound, but one flaw that is truly evident in it, is its subjective center. Da-sein has a concern for its own-most potentiality, and not for the other. Levinas has incorporated a relationship with the other; by embracing the other, he transcends this subjective standpoint and adds a fully operational system, based on an objective mean. Levinas’ philosophy is geared towards the other because by encountering a relationship with the other, the I and the other form a concept that can never be reducible: infinity!