Expressionism, Affirmation, Freedom; and Becoming: the Unity of Spinoza and Schelling’s Pantheism and Philosophy (Deleuze & Heidegger).

Why would I seek to have an initial preface or have introductory remarks in a simple paper of this magnitude?  Perhaps the answer to this question lies in the paper’s title: ‘Expressionism, Affirmation, Freedom; and Becoming: The Unity of Spinoza and Schelling’s Pantheism and Philosophy’. For the reader, there must be several questions that are puzzling. Is there a unity between Spinoza and Schelling’s Pantheism? Do they not offer different arguments explaining their intricate models of the universe and of God? How could one scholar unify the totality of both of their philosophies into one succinct system? Some would argue that it is not even possible to make this connection. If it is seemingly impossible, why would one attempt to do such a thing? Perhaps we are merely looking at the matter in a positive and negative way. My attempt is to modestly examine how both thinkers’ concepts in their philosophy fill in the necessary gaps of the whole. I do not simply want to put Spinoza against Schelling or Schelling against Spinoza: I seek to read both authors through each other so that we can form a commonality between their concepts. The matter at hand is not simply the argument surrounding pantheism as a whole, but the system of freedom, becoming, and affirmation employed by both thinkers.

The real focus of both Spinoza and Schelling is to move away from inadequate knowledge in order for there to be room for the pure affirmation of life through becoming. In turn, this affirmation will lead to a sustainable, dynamic and vital form of freedom. However, another problem arises here: a tension in continuity between the dynamic model of Schelling and the geometrical, mechanistic model of Spinoza. Does Spinoza’s method of disclosure through a geometrical universe limit his system to an utterly lifeless mechanism? If so, how can we unify both philosophers’concepts? The biggest criticisms that Schelling holds against Spinoza deal with the lack of life within the Spinozist model and his model of fatalistic pantheism which leaves no room for freedom (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW338-339). Yet a philosophy’s power is always measured by the concepts that it creates, and through the creation of such concepts the inevitable meaning is changed. This framework imposes and imparts a new set of divisions towards actions and life. This is the purpose of Spinoza’s form of expression: to recreate the requirements of life and to illustrate how God expresses himself through all of his attributes (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 333). In order to show the reader that there is vitality and life in Spinoza’s philosophy (which can be reconciled with Schelling’s dynamic model), we must investigate the concept of expressionism in Spinoza’s method (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 16). Spinoza’s notion of both immanence and pantheism is explicitly founded on the concept of expression and expression itself supports the model of univocity (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 333). This is Spinoza’s thesis: that through expression we gain a free univocal being as opposed to an implied state of indifference, which leads to a state of neutrality. Pure affirmation can only be followed and realized by a philosophy of immanence and pantheism (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 333). The next question that should arise to the reader is: what are the differences between Spinoza and Schelling’s notions of freedom, immanence and pantheism? The following questions will be answered as our gradual investigation unfolds. I would like the reader to know that these critiques and conclusions are all based on my own interpretation of both Spinoza and Schelling. Furthermore, I implore the reader to be charitable to the accounts that are expressed in the following essay as they relate to a synthesis of philosophy, of expression, affirmation, becoming; and pantheism.

 

The Dynamic-Life/Geometrical-Mechanistic Model

We must seek a gradual understanding of both the dynamic and the mechanistic model before we can proceed to the philosophies of Spinoza and Schelling. In essence, the Dynamic model holds beings together. It allows our access to be folded and unfolded, and this process of the dynamic is the tension and opening up of the world to beings (Steigerwald, Notes from class, On October 9^th, 2012). We can already see that this form is not a determined model but rather is ‘undetermined’ and allows the experience and complications of life to endeavour a relationship with ourselves (Steigerwald, Notes from class, On October 9^th, 2012). According to Schelling, the error in philosophy is to make a world or a universe of God based on strict, rigid deterministic necessity. The whole model of this Dynamic versus mechanistic opposition can really be disclosed as life versus the mechanistic. This model paints a picture of the universe which is inevitably deterministic and stuck to following the laws that placed its formation in motion. Yet it also strips ‘the life’ of life right out of itself. We see in the mechanistic model a heavy order of a logical representation, embarking on a flattening out of all life to a general lifeless logicality. We can see the tinkering of its clock-like motion: the screws and pieces of the parts all complying in there law like fashion; but is this life? (Steigerwald, Notes from class, On October 9^th, 2012). This mechanistic model isn’t life, but then we must posit the question of what life really is? As Heidegger states, life is organic and it is also nature. As well, this system and nature form a coexistence with man (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.21). This initial accord is found in everything, positive and negative, and represents identity and difference. It is a free flowing, creative relationship that is spawned in the living form (Steigerwald, Notes from class, On October 9^th, 2012). The dynamic model embodies freedom. In the beginning we see chaos, and from chaos we have a ‘dark principle’: a seed that is already in the ground, dark and enclosed. Suddenly, the seed moves from ‘the dark principle’ to ‘a higher principle’, ‘the principle of light’, we move from the chaotic to the creative and this gradual progression is becoming (Schelling, The Ages of the World p. 200). This dynamic model affirms life because everything is in this process of becoming. First, there is death and then life. There is a move from the dark principle to the light principle.  There are clear dualities here with chaos/creation and evil/good. This represents the tension, the folding and unfolding of all opposites (Steigerwald, Notes from class, On October 9^th, 2012).

Heidegger states that Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ is completely dominated by mathematics and has as its sole foundation the requirements of mathematical knowledge. It also has a separate function which is directed at man’s actions; and in the end, is bound to a giant … “one-sidedness” (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.33). The important thing to note is that Spinoza was greatly impacted by Descartes, as Schelling was impacted by Kant and perhaps Fichte as well. Initially, Descartes was concerned with certainty, and Spinoza following the tradition of his academic peers wanted to find this so called “certainty” but rename it as adequate knowledge. We will return to this idea of adequate knowledge later but what is important, is that Descartes certainty relied on deduction. We know that deductive knowledge is based on mathematical principles. Now we must ask two separate questions: does a geometrical method imply a mechanistic universe? Does the mechanistic universe also imply a geometrical or mathematical foundation? Descartes saw in geometry a method of avoiding error; geometry in fact served as the model of the universe. However, why use such a model? Geometry in fact represented the geometrical universe, transforming the inside of human reality to an outside that was able to surpass the bounds of human experience and proceed past all illusions (Descartes, Discourse on method p.53). The aforementioned point is not why Spinoza used the following method. It merely shows that he was influenced by the idea to some degree. 

In Euclidian geometry, Spinoza saw a moment where the parts of the whole could in a sense enter into a free relationship with the whole, forming one cohesive unit which expresses itself fully through all of its parts (Spinoza, The Ethics, p.15). Deleuze states that in theory a geometrical method is limited. Nevertheless, what Spinoza liked about its model was the fact that it could disclose the distributive character of any property that it was investigating (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 20). Spinoza was intrigued by causality and what a mathematical method could express as a collective being through its causes. In causality, Spinoza saw that geometrical figures could be explicated and defined genetically to its nearest cause (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 22). From all of this evidence, Spinoza was able to see that mathematics incorporated this fundamental theory of expression.

Spinoza’s system is not dictated by an over-arching mechanism but is to be interpreted as a philosophy of expression. He sets out to rediscover a new nature by creating a new logic and a new ontology, thus creating a new materialism (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 321). What is this concept of expression? To sufficiently answer this, allow me to provide a quotation from Deleuze:

 

“The concept of expression applies to Being determined as God, insofar as God expresses himself in the world. It applies to ideas determined as true, insofar as true ideas express God and the world” (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 321).

 

Spinoza states being (which encompasses acting, knowing; and producing) is all- important and fundamental to forms of human expression and existence (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 323). Since nature has its own specific depth, expressionism is what gives man the adequate knowledge to penetrate into the depths of nature and allows a new relationship with God. This new relationship is the birth of a new logic, one that makes man more than simply a ‘thing’, but expresses man as a spiritual automaton (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 323). Man, according to Spinoza, stands conjoined with God as a combination of a spiritual automaton with the world and God (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 322). The spiritual automaton would not be anything without the nature of God, thus expressing himself through his nature and the world. This notion of combination and conjoining is quite similar to Heidegger’s notion in Schelling of ‘the jointure of Being’ as the structure of a being as a being’ (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.119). What would man be without God and what would God be without man? The two theories mirror one another, for in Schelling another kind of combination exists. The nature that represents the ground of God must stand in order to make God and man possible (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.119). In Schelling, we do see an underlying mathematics, however it is a divine mathematics that divides, separates and forms oppositions. We see a logic that is devoted to the law of identity, the copula, and the formation of opposites, as well as their unity: subject, predicate, dark/light, man/God, evil/good. The two philosophers now stand in a close connection with one another. We must rename the two models opposition, Geometric/Expressive and Dynamic/Life. Both of these models now stand as an expression of the affirmation of life. However, it is obvious that the dynamic/life model of Schelling incorporates the vital connection of man and freedom. Does this mean that Spinoza’s geometrical/expressive model also retains this vital connection to freedom and man?

 

Freedom, Expression, and The Will

A theme that is carried through the entirety of Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ is directed at breaking the traditional chain and link between freedom and will. Freedom, which is conceived as the ability to choose or create, is what Spinoza calls “freedom of indifference” (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.69). “Enlightened Freedom” which is the highest model of freedom, is based on a model where one has the ability to adjust oneself to any effect (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.70). What essentially disturbs Schelling is that, according to Spinoza, freedom is never a property of the will. In essential terms, freedom only refers to a mode’s essence (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.68). Schelling has the right to be suspicious here, because in a sense, it seems that freedom is based on a mode’s “human” essence and that essence is in turn caused by God’s infinite attributes. If these attributes are always necessitated by another cause, ad-infintum, then there is no denying God essential freedom; but what about man’s freedom? The problem here, according to Schelling, is that Spinoza’s real mission is elucidated by a widespread realism. The true form of pantheism in essence has both realism and idealism working within a dynamic philosophy of nature (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW349-351). Schelling feels that Spinoza’s own system lacks this synthesis between both realism and idealism. For Spinoza, the concept of freedom is a fundamental illusion. The illusion is the fact that consciousness is blind to causes: man is never born free but becomes free and frees himself (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.71). We are free in the sense that we are affected by external and internal causes. Knowledge plays a key role here. Life will not always go our way but the way we think and interpret those actions and causes is how man can free himself. The shackles of mankind start with laws and religion.

According to Spinoza, the bible represents a law, but not an all encompassing law: a law that simply tells us to obey. Whenever we experience a knowledge based on analogy or sign we connect these inadequate forms of knowledge to life. These inadequate ideas lead us astray since the message behind the meaning is never expressive, but inexpressive. There are two forms of inadequate knowledge: analogies and signs (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 315). Analogies always relate to a myth or a pseudo-story and can never achieve that vital expression of life. Signs always refer to hearsay, thus never getting to the bottom of real knowledge but only being referred to as an appropriation of an inexpressive form of life. Both are always masked with separate laws always denoting a coercive structure. Inexpressive relations of knowledge, in turn, really amount to nothing but sheer obedience. They tell us “you must” without ever explicating a reason why. The real politics behind the Bible are good and bad forces of nature (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 273).  These forces affect us and as a result form sad passions and joyous passions. Notice here, there are only, two forms of forces, good and bad; there is no good or evil in nature (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 315). These forces in turn form what Spinoza calls a “non-essential attribute”.

 

My reader must at some point express some concern, since my initial plan was to show a relation and unity in Spinoza and Schelling’s philosophy. Getting rid of evil altogether forms a blockage between the commonality of both of these thinkers. Schelling states “that the real and vital concept is that freedom is the capacity for good and evil” (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW352-353). However, good and bad forces have the same effects as good and evil. What Spinoza is getting at is the manner in which how we are affected by these forms of knowledge. When we are affected by a bad force, our own life becomes affected: it stays in a state of decomposition and diminishes our life power or life vitality. Where the concept of freedom comes in to play is this notion of always being affected. We are induced by these forces of life and we can either rise above them and overcome an affect, or we can succumb to bad affects which lead us to sad passions (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.71).  

 

We are always in a state of being affected, and this tension (this ‘always already’) is at the core of man’s composition. A philosophy of expressionism strives in the heart of expressive forces. Thus, in order to reach enlightened freedom we must get a grasp of adequate knowledge of good forces, which only increase our power and life vitality. This is the ultimate goal of ‘The Ethics,’ what must we do in order to be affected by a maximum of joyful passions (Spinoza, The Ethics, p.91). Hence, ‘The Ethics’ moves away from the ground of morality, because the moral code is simply a concatenation of analogies and signs, in order to perpetuate the same message: to obey. Deleuze states that this is why Spinoza’s work is centered on mankind, for it reaches the bounds and limits of an ‘ethology of man’ (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.27). The closer we are to attaining ‘enlightened freedom’ the closer we are to God and a true concentrated form of freedom, united with God. Consider the following statement from Deleuze:

 

“When we are aligned our essence adequately expresses God’s essence, and the affections of our essence adequately express our essence. We ‘become’ completely expressive” (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 315).

 

Expression embodies a double movement; it unfolds, explicates and unwinds God’s essence and the affection of our own essence, so it can restore what is expressed in a relationship of ‘expresser-expression’ (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 333).

Spinoza has a very unique conception of the will. He calls the will the ‘conatus’ (Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 121). The ‘conatus’ is a yearning, a desiring, and a principle in us that is always striving-to-be (Spinoza, The Ethics, p. 123).  This striving-to-be can be understood in Nietzschean terms. If our passion and our yearning are led by inadequate forms of knowledge, our ‘conatus’ becomes an inexpressive form, ‘a will to nothingness’ (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.17). This is the case because nothingness represents the lowest form. When we strive towards affects that induce sad passions; we continue to go down the dark path, yearning more affects, slowly diminishing our life force, and our power. This is the greatest danger because from the sad passions we endanger ourselves down a slippery slope that leads to the gradual progression of fear, envy, greed and hate. All of these lead to our inevitable destruction (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p.19).

 

When we strive towards joyful passions, which are surrounded by adequate forms of knowledge, our desire becomes filled with the force of expression, charged by life’s vital power. Our ‘conatus’ then becomes ‘a will to power’ because we are now being affected by forces that increase our power and align our nature with the expressivity of God. When we express life’s vital power, a synthesis is formed between our actions, passions, knowledge, will, and God. We are free in the sense that we are affected by forces, both good and bad.  Only we can determine our actions through the right kind of knowledge. If we go down the dark path, to a life of nothingness, we enter the realm of the ‘freedom of indifference’. If we embrace freedom’s highest potential, we enter the realm of ‘enlightened freedom’, also known as pure expression (Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy p. 72). Life becomes a struggle between the dialectic of these two forms of freedom and knowledge. On the one hand we have the model of inadequate ideas/sad passions/freedom of indifference/will to nothingness, and the other half, adequate knowledge/joyful passion enlightened freedom/will to power/expressivity. This is Spinoza’s mission of life and philosophy: to remain aligned with God’s univocal expressivity.

The reader should be wondering by now if we can find a unity between Schelling’s conception of freedom and Spinoza’s. If this seems to be an impossible task let us ponder on some close connections between the two. They both encompass themes of the will and yearning, they both incorporate images of darkness and light. There is the sense that both truly are philosophies of becoming and lead us to an expressive affirmation of life. What is the most decisive connection between both models is that they strive for a close connection between God and man. Let us proceed onwards to our investigation.

 

God and Pantheism

We will now venture into Spinoza’s conception of God and pantheism and relate it to Schelling’s conception. We must now closely examine Schelling arguments surrounding freedom, but in order to do so, we must realize that freedom surrounds the entirety of Schelling philosophy. Schelling’s thought deals with both the ontological and the theological, and we will endeavour to uncover this relationship through an understanding of his notions on God, freedom, and pantheism (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.51).  If philosophy is lacking a foundation in a living reality, and is stuck only in abstract concepts, then life looses its richness as a vital dynamic cosmos (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. OA427-430).

 

Schelling states that God must hold the ground of his existence in himself (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW356-359). The ground cannot be thought of as a mere philosophical concept, because then we strip away the life of the ground; it becomes unreal (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW356-358). The ground has God’s existence within him, but this ground does not represent the absolute form of God proper (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW356-358). So we must ask the following question: what is this ground?  Schelling explicates that the ground represents God’s existence as nature within God (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW356-358). The ground pertains to a being that is conjoined to God, yet it is still inevitably quite distinct from him (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW356-358). The relation between God and the ground can be explained by the tight connection between light and gravity (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW356-359). Heidegger clarifies this connection rather well:

 

“But precisely for Schelling gravity and light “are” in their relation of Being and essence within created nature only a certain expression of the essential jointure in Being itself, the jointure: ground-essence. Gravity is what burdens and pulls, contracts and in this connection what withdraws and flees. But light is always the “clearing,” what opens and spreads, what develops. What is light is always the clearing of what is intertwined and entangled, what is veiled and obscure. Thus, what is to be illuminated precedes light as its ground from which it emerges in order to be itself in light” (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.114).

 

Heidegger wants us to realize that in no way is this example meant to be taken as a simple analogy that paints us a picture of the unity. He wants us to be aware of the fact that both are identical in the unfolding of being yet different in their capabilities (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.115).  We should be mindful of what Schelling is doing here.  By moving away from the idea of images and analogy and concentrating on the unique enigma that is unfolding here, Schelling is not falling into the trap of creating inadequate ideas of knowledge. There is no pseudo-law behind this, no subtle apprehension telling us to ‘obey’ but rather we should recognize the sheer magnitude and expression of the totality of Being.

 

Becoming plays an immense role in Schelling’s philosophy. There is a catch though: things cannot become in God. In order for life to become, they must be divided from him. They must become in a different ground. Like Spinoza, Schelling realizes that they cannot become outside of God alone. Nothing can be outside of God, therefore the tension is resolved by grounding their existence in a ground that is not God, but the ground of his existence (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. OA427-430).

 

I would like to represent this division as a ‘divine mathematics,’ so that it can echo the same order and be joined with Spinoza. This divide represents a yearning, a desire, which the eternal one feels in order to give birth to himself (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. OA427-430).  The yearning is not God himself, it represents the desire God feels to give birth to himself (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. OA427-430). There is not a state of unity in this yearning, for there is not a state of ‘the understanding,’ so the yearning represents a will with no understanding, a will in-itself that is not separate from God. The understanding thus becomes the will inside the will. This whole process of becoming Schelling calls ‘the logic of the enigma (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. OA427-430). The logic of the enigma is surrounded by a constant dialectic which discloses the yearning and desiring as the understanding of the will. Yet this is not a conscious process but is gradually a part of the understanding of the divine (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW359-360). The aforementioned dialectic represents the essence of yearning in and for itself (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW359-360). We can think of how Heidegger uses the word dialectic here always in transition. Thus, this process is always in a constant state of transition (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.115). Mankind can only grasp this unity in thought (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW359-360). The self-revelation of God represents the world coming into existence, in order, form and rule (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW359-360). This self-revelation of God with order and form and rule also has anarchy within its ground. Schelling wants us to understand that with this process (of order being brought into life), anarchy is also posited as part of this whole. This is the aspect of life that remains incomprehensible to us because it is not in the understanding but is eternally in the ground. This is the indivisible remainder (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW359-360). This is necessary for all of life, for without darkness mankind and all creatures have no reality (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW359-360). The darkness becomes a necessary beginning. If we think of a simple seed, its birth starts off in the dark ground. It thus stretches its arms to the light and becomes, but only because its origins were from the ground. Thus, it moves from the darkness to the light and this is life (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW359-360). Schelling clarifies this connection by stating:

 

“ All birth is birth from darkness into the light; the seed kernel must be sank into the earth and die in darkness so that the more beautiful shape of light may lift and unfold itself in the radiance of the sun” (Schelling, p. SW359-360). 

 

This is freedom in its most concentrated form, because life needs darkness in order to exist. It is similar to the duality between good and evil, as they both need to coexist: we would not know the light without the dark, and we would not experience the good without evil. We would not possess freedom otherwise. The capacity for these opposites is the inevitable capacity for freedom (Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the essence of Human Freedom p. SW352-353). So in essence, Schelling’s pantheism is centered on the possibility of freedom in beings as a whole and directed at their intricate relationship with the ground and God (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.87). Since God is everything, Heidegger states that God is man, because the ‘is’ attached to the statement of ‘God is man’ identifies a belonging with God in one unity. However, the unity claims that man belongs to God but as something different from God. This difference allows for our freedom because mankind has come from the ground of God (Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom p.87). 

 

In Spinoza, God expresses himself in the world, and the absolute multiplicity of this expression forms the relation of God, mankind and the world. We can think of God’s power of expressivity through his attributes as closely linked with Schelling’s model of God and the absolute ground. This model of absolute expressionism in turn expresses the whole world, which is the totality of the chosen world, and this represents the manifestation of God’s eternal will (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 273). ).  Spinoza’s conception of pantheism is thus surrounded by the unity of man and God through God’s expressive attributes. Thus, Spinoza concludes:

 

“The path of salvation is the path of expression itself, to become expressive, which is to become active, vital and free; is to express the essence of God, to have affections and powers; and to affirm life through our own constant search of striving-to-be, in order to fulfill our own essence through God”  (Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza p. 273).

 

In conclusion, this paper was a modest attempt to link together both Spinoza and Schelling’s philosophy. Why would I try to do such a task? It is because I felt that both of these systems work in favour for life. Both of these philosophers’ concepts and theories surround the notions of affirmation, expression and becoming. I found that both the expressive and dynamic models worked in favour for life; and so, instead of putting both of these thinkers against one another, I conjoined the two together in order to synthesize the strengths and weaknesses of both of their systems. I had planned to read both thinkers through one another while pushing all of their concepts and theories to their farthest reaches. This is the ultimate task of philosophy; in our current state of contemporary thought, theories surrounding life and freedom are highly lacking, so it is always an excellent exercise to go back and revisit thinkers of the past that also deal with issues that can still affect us today. Hopefully this work will also fill the reader with thoughts and questions regarding the pursuit of these vital issues.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza, Practical Philosophy. San Francisco: City Lights Books,       1988. Print.

 

Deleuze, Gilles. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. New York: Zone Books ;, 1990. Print.

 

Descartes, René, and Paul J. Olscamp. Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology. Rev. ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub, 2001. Print.

 

Heidegger, Martin, and Joan Stambaugh. Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985. Print.

 

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, and Jason M. Wirth. The Ages Of The World. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Print

 

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von. Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Print.

 

Spinoza, Benedictus de, and E. M. Curley. Ethics. London: Penguin Books, 1996. Print.

 

Steigerwald, Joan. Notes from class, On October 9^th, 2012.

 

 

Badiou and the Violence of Thought: Radical Choice, Subjectivity and Truth. By Christopher Satoor

                        

 

 

 

 

What does it mean to take “one more step, a single step” … towards universality? (Badiou, Manifesto For Philosophy P. 32).  What does it mean to be forced to think and what kind of thought would we need in order to make ‘a logic of a world’ shift? (Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, March 26^th, 2013). For Badiou, philosophy must be reckless or it is simply nothing at all. Thought must force a shift in a transcendental of a

world and it must force us all to think. This recklessness is the violence of thought; it is the unknown form of a discipline, opening a new terrain to make one more step possible.  It is the moment when we are pushed to think beyond our own desires; it comes in the form of militant participation and brutal contingency (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 110). Above all, it comes down to a single choice; one must become a subject to truth, and stay loyal to the event. This loyalty binds the subject to their radical choice incorporating them in a body, a collective, or an encounter rallied together for a cause.

Badiou is concerned with the effective appearance of a subject and a truth; and their existence and participation in a world (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 119). The question is how far one must go in that single step, that radical choice and its commitment to an effective appearance? What does one lose and gain in the violence of thought? The following essay will investigate that “One more step” and its relationship to radical choice, the subject and truth and whether we need a violent thought to push us into committed action in order for there to be eternal truths. I will need to do an in-depth full analysis of Badiou’s ontology in order to lay out the foundations behind the violence of thought, radical choice, subjectivity and truth.

 

Philosophy, for Badiou, rests in the realm of the transformation of a subject. This transformation is the radical alteration and disruption of existence (Badiou, Philosophy for Militants p. 8). Yet how would one measure such a disruption of existence? It is through phenomenology or the theory of appearing, which in turn, concerns problems of identity. This requires Badiou to open a space, to properly think a place for appearing to situate the being-there in a world (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 49) Badiou makes it quite clear that philosophy is not a body of knowledge, its rules and regulations are not directed at a specific discourse but surround the singularity of an act (Badiou, Philosophy for Militants p. 10).  Philosophy is an action, and this action can be related to the corruption of the youth that Socrates was charged and condemned with (Badiou, Philosophy for Militants p. 10).  This corruption of the youth embodies the philosophical act, because the very act of corrupting the youth means teaching against the norms of a society, those norms that make the people submit to the tyranny of opinion (Badiou, Philosophy for Militants, p.10) This corruption as an act is to give the youth the possibility to challenge those accepted beliefs that demand of them; approval, imitation and obedience (Badiou, Philosophy for Militants, p.10) In essence, it is arming the youth with real issues that embody a collective act, whether in debate or revolt if needed. The revolt represents the new principles of a true critique that can be articulated to the entire body (Badiou, Philosophy for Militants, p.11).  The philosophical act must always take the form of a decision, where one must clearly choose a path, which invokes a clear separation between … “a this or a that” (Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, April 2nd, 2013) Badiou states that thought is a form of practise and this practise is putting thought to the test. The decision is the push and the beginning of a truth which are intricately connected with one another. A truth represents the real process of the fidelity of an event and thus provokes the creation of a subject who in turn bears this fidelity (Badiou, Ethics an Essay on the Understanding of Evil P.41). Thus, the production of truths according to Badiou can be seen as a militant thought, produced by those who remain faithful to such an event. But why must Badiou carry on with the idea of militant thought because it is only through militant thinking where risk, activity, decision and fidelity are invoked in the active participation of an event (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, p, 81). Such a truth puts a whole in knowledge separating it from opinion and leaving the room for the production of truths (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy p.81).  What we need to investigate are the following questions 1) why does Badiou stress the need for the production of truths and what is the opposition between truths and opinions? 2) What is the fundamental relationship between the subject and the event? 3) How does radical choice enter into the equation?

 

How dangerous is the freedom of opinion?  Badiou makes it abundantly clear that there are many forms of opinion, from polling and feeble questionnaires to counter-opinion and in some cases forms of non-opinion. But the very basis of our society or parliamentary-democracy is structured around the freedom of opinion; and such opinion is a giant mass unfurling as an authority that also is utilised as a marker for an objective consensus. This translucency of such a consensus has a sway over the people that carries them away. Being carried away by the current of opinion is what limits the role of the decision and one would wonder how much subjectivity is really being actualized if individuals are just going along with the sway of the mass?  This is the problem that Badiou points out that there are no principles behind the usage of such opinion. How can we ever have a systematized account of all the various and diverse forms of opinions? How would anyone truly have a say in any matter?  What exactly does a law of opinion without principles look like? These are important questions and one would have to wonder what would be implemented in the place of opinion according to Badiou? His answer is a part of that ‘one-more-step’ in the direction of Cartesian thought, to resurrect thought and the subject and Being back into the conditions of philosophy (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy p, 32).

 

 

If philosophy is to have axioms they cannot be tainted by rhetoric or public opinion , philosophy’s axioms must not be under the rule of the democrat who is also known as the sophist. What the freedom of opinion allows, is precisely that freedom to change those axioms, thus negating the universality of truths (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 19) Philosophy’s never ending battle is always situated against opinion, and those who are opposed to universal truths. The democrat or the sophist is as real today as they were for Plato.

 

The Philosopher and the Democrat will only agree on two conditions i) that individuals exist; and ii) communities belonging to those individual exist. With this acknowledgement Badiou must accept a certain materialist postulate; there are bodies and languages (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 19). This postulate becomes the main ideology that consumes the world, but the philosopher is not bothered by the ideology per se, he/she is also subjugated by democratic materialism. This means that what exists in our world occurs under the axiom of democratic materialism, “there are only bodies and languages” (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 21).  This is the state of our current contemporary world, accepting such a limitation that only x and y exist.

If democratic materialism is the axiom that pertains to all that happens in our world how are truths possible?  Badiou explains that there is an exception to the axiom and that exception comes in the form of science, art, politics and love (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 22).  Truths act as a form of resistance and can be appropriated by individuals that partake in their materialization and progress. They are still materially affiliated with the axiom but their creation and implementation raises their value. Truths thus hold a transwordly value, and the philosopher must introduce them into the prevailing world of democratic materialism (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 22).

 

Bodies and languages are the only factors surrounding opinion; a truth can never be reduced to mere opinion for a truth is appropriated and seized not in this world, but of another world, one that is seen as insignificant until raised up from the current of a truth procedure (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 22). In this sense truths can be seen as the sole factor that affirms and unifies worlds (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 22). A truth, in essence, does not belong to any specific world, its purpose, is to show that although worlds differ in several aspects, they are essentially the same because of the truths that have been called into being (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 22). In other words, two worlds grasped in one reality; and this coming together of worlds, are unified solely by truths alone. He states . . .

 

“Truth, and truths alone, unify worlds. They transfix the disparate composites of bodies and languages in such a way that, for a split second or sometimes longer these are, as it were, welded together. This is why truths introduce within the established play of opinions, a sudden change of scale … through the welding of worlds” (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 24).

           

            Opinion is always limited to the freedom of repeating established norms that have taken hold of a given society, but a truth opens a world to a new “world-to-come” (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 24).This opening produces a shift in the  logic or an order of a world. This ‘world-to-come’ is always already presupposed in the infinity of the true because a truth is always that which is rising up as an excess, or a people, or proletariat, or lovers embodied as a collective truth, affirming their place in the welding of the two worlds (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 25).  This is the truest form of real freedom which is established for all worlds and not just the subordination of the one.  

 

Philosophy produces a principle of principles one that thinks in the direction of truths; and not of the freedom of opinions (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 25).  Thought for Badiou can be considered as a form of labour that is in search of production, process, constraint and discipline (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 25).  This form of labour makes the philosopher, in a sense, a worker who is given the tasks of detecting; and finding the truths of his/her time that have been long forgotten while, being strongly opposed to the lifeless opinion that surrounds our society (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 25). The philosopher must then weld together the separate worlds in order for a truth to appear. This means that a truth is more then just an abstract entity, a truth must exists as a body, in-a-world; and although they maybe rare, truths are both timeless and eternal (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy p. 26). We will have to return to how a truth as a body, appears in the world, when we can identify what a subject is and its connection to the event. It is still unclear how Philosophy and the philosopher welds worlds together and how a truth is universal, so it important to understand the conditions of philosophy and what precisely those conditions pertain to.

 

The conditions of philosophy are called truth procedures and they are not in any way influenced by religions, rhetoric/opinions or myths (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy p. 33). Badiou posits four conditions, or truth procedures, of philosophy ‘the matheme’, ‘the poetic’, the political’ and ‘the amorous’. Philosophy in itself cannot create truths this is why the need for the four conditions; and as I stated earlier philosophy is not a body of knowledge, but action; and these generic procedures become heightened by their eventful existence (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy p. 36). A truth has a paradoxical relationship in the world, it must be new and something rare, and reach the very core of its being as a truth. This means that a truth must in a sense, impose itself on the world, where it is heightened and seen at maximal intensity. The origin of a truth is based on its connection to an event (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy p. 36). A situation or a state of things can be seen as a multiple and for a truth to occur; a truth procedure must supplement itself into the situation (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy p. 36). Badiou states …

 

“Philosophy sets out to think its time by putting the state of procedures conditioning it into common place. Its operations, whatever they maybe, always aim to think ‘together’, to configurate within an unique exercise of thought the epochal disposition of the matheme, poetic, political invention and the amorous …philosophy’s sole question is indeed that of truth not that it produces any, but because it offers a access to the unity of a moment of truths, a conceptual site in which the generic procedures are thought” (Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy p. 37).

 

            How would a truth appear in the world? And how could we constitute a truth as a body in a world? These are rather important questions. We now know that philosophy doesn’t produce its truths but has 4 conditions -truth procedures- which are supplemented into a situation suspending a truth from the situation (Badiou, Being and Event p.25). If there isn’t such a supplementation then there is no truth, to rupture a hole in knowledge. But just exactly how can a truth appear in the first place as a condition supplemented into the situation?  A situation is the very place of a “taking-place” or occurrence of a pending truth that is hovering over the situation until its eventful origin has been brought to bear on the world (Badiou, Being and Event p.25). This bringing to bear on the world is the risk that one faces, thrown into a position of mere chance and activity.  

 

The existence of truths that appear in our world do not in anyway interrupt Badiou’s own materialist postulate. This taking-place can be identified as another question, how can we properly think a body, as a truth appearing in the world?  Yet a series of problems arise. If truths are interwoven as bodies in a world; and at the same time, the singularity of their appearance are created out of the sheer materials of a particular world, how can a body in a world be representative of a given truth? (Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy, p.32). These so called truths and their origins are not contingent upon a god, this is Badiou’s paradox. The materials of a world impart a presence that is lifted to the level of the infinite and then considered as eternal truths in time (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.32). If we strip down being to its bare essentials, it can be qualified as a pure multiplicity. However, this multiplicity is a complex multiple made up of a series of multiplicities (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.32).  This interweaving relationship between multiplicities is netted together out of the void (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.32).

 

Appearing for Badiou means that a pure multiplicity as a multiplicity is assigned to a world (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.32). Being assigned to a world means that a multiplicity must be indentified by its numerous forms of relation to other multiples in a given world (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.32). Thus a multiplicity is differentiated by its own elements and attributes and of course it surrounding environment (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p33).  This means that a multiplicity is visibly connected to a system based on the differences between elements and identities that correlate to all other multiples (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p33).  

 

Appearing for Badiou has a unique structure that is imposed upon by the logical identity of a given world. Thus, appearing for Badiou is contingent solely upon the network of differences and identities amongst a series of multiples (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p33). For a singularity or a truth process to arise upon the scene, Badiou must have an intricate way to decipher the relations between any given set of multiples (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.34). This means there must be a specific criterion for the existence of a truth in any situation of a world.  Now the question is how we differentiate between two multiples?  Any two multiples will differ in composition if they contain or lack a specific element that the other does not possess (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p33). This is what separates the two multiples, the very precise amount of elements that they contain. If multiple Y has elements (a, b, c) and multiple Z contains elements (a, b, c, d), then this is all the evidence needed to prove their differences in identity (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.34). Yet these differences, according to Badiou are based on an extensional dimension, meaning they are ontologically different based on how their Being-there appears in a given world   (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.35).  

 

There is certain logic that is applied to all multiplicities and the degrees to which their identities and differences fluctuate in a world based on the circumstances of how they appear in the logical frame. I will give an example of this. If we take a group of people (High school students in a blue and green uniform) walking amongst others on a busy day in the streets of Toronto, all of the people represented in this group or multiple will appear as the same as everyone else walking by as a blur of the mass. If someone were to watch the group from a nearby coffee shop they would be able to tell that although the group looks similar they are definitely very different in identity purposes. This shows us that from two different points, there are different degrees of visibility and identity between the two cases of the multiple.

 

Badiou posits a necessary ordered structure behind the identity of degrees. This system allows the group seen by the coffee shop watcher a minimal amount of degrees of identity as opposed to the city street where the group is seen as a blur amongst the mass or at maximal degree of identity. This multiple appears differently based on the visible degree of its identity in a given world.  In some cases a multiple’s minimum level of identity will be registered at a zero mark, while at others times it will appear as a maximum degree. This fluctuation of the degree of identities from maximum to minimum is part of the order structure of a world and behind the logic of appearing or being-there (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, p.38).  This being-there or as Badiou calls it the there-being is the localization of a pure multiple. This logic or world is a system of rules that can be also called a transcendental, which indirectly helps disclose degrees of identities and differences of a multiple (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 40).

 

For Badiou existence is not a specific predicate of any kind of traditional subject but belongs to the logic of appearing (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 52). The logic of a world always refers to the distribution of degrees of identities and differences which abides by the transcendental of a world (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 53). Elements of a multiple can be placed in a relationship with other multiples whose given elements consist of different degrees of identity (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 54). This implies that there is a system of degrees making it possible for all to see the fluctuation between degrees of identities. Now these elements correlate between degrees of identity that can be registered as larger or smaller. Every multiple has a couple of elements (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 55). A transcendental will always refer to the correlation between two given elements of a multiple. This relationship between the elements of a multiple which refers to size; larger or smaller can be identified as identity function (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 57). This identity function is a basic part of the logic of appearing (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 57). When the identity function of two elements is at a maximal level the elements will be identical. If, however, the identity function takes a minimal level these two elements will be quite different from each other (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 58). Multiples that appear are arranged as a very complex network of degrees of identity between their elements; their existence solely depends on the value of its identity function when one and the same element has peaked and reached its maximal intensity (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 58). The existence of a multiple is contingent upon a transcendental degree of its self identity in a world (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 58). This means that existence plays a pivotal part in the logic of a world, as the visible appearance of any multiple in a world (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 58). However, if a multiple exists with a minimal degree of identity, the multiple does not exist in the present world. It is in the world per se, but its visible intensity is at the mark of zero degrees, making its existence a non-existence (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 60). It cannot be visibly seen in the world because its own appearance is its very annihilation.

 

A good example of this would be visiting workers from a different country called in to do work, paid poorly only for their labour and not given the right that every other individual in the country has. They exist, but in the laws of the world there existence is a non existence. In a given society there are people that make up a “count” because in the society they are accounted for and clearly visible; in the aforementioned case these workers represent a people below the count and their existence is a non-existence (Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, March 26^th, 2013). The being-there of this being is identified as an inexistent of its world. This is the most pivotal foundation for Badiou because the world has the capacity to allow inexistence; it makes it extremely important for events to arise, which not only transforms a multiple’s elements from inexistent to existent, but allows the room for a shifting transcendental (Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, March 26^th, 2013). This prioritises the need for truths, events, subjects and conditions for the sole purpose of emancipation. Badiou’s project is to liberate oneself from the oppressive regime of opinion to reconfigure and reconstruct truths of a situation by incorporating truth procedures led by a militant intervention (Hallward, A Subject to Truth p. 319). We can begin to identify the close relationship between the subject and an event.

For a truth to exist it needs to appear with a maximum level of intensity, thus disclosing its self identity. A truth must exist as a modification of its transcendental direction.  Since truths are the only exception to the principle of materialism it must in some way affect the very rigid rules of a world (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 75). This means that the rarity and exceptional component in a truth in some way can change the very logic of a world. A transcendental is considered the measure of all existence or the capture of multiple elements whose identities and differences appear. In some way a truth must be able to aid in the shifting and mutation of elements and parts (Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, March 26^th, 2013). This means that appearance has a unique relationship between multiplicities and the transcendental. We still don’t know how change occurs? How is a truth elevated and how is the subject introduced and what is the importance of the event?

 

In order for change to occur, a multiple must be introduced as a new entry; it must belong to itself and abide by its own laws.  Every multiple has an inexistent element. When this element reaches ‘maximal existential value’ an event occurs (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 79). What is called a site is the new phase of a multiple or an event seen in a very different light brought to bear on the world in a new way. I had mentioned emancipation and liberation, what is taking place is the raising up of an inexistent from its minimal state to a maximal value; and this is the birth of a truth. Only through an event can a truth become. Its origin must take place through the momentum of the event and its elements rising up.

 

The Paris Commune marks a similar event, a political event or truth which witnessed the people that were previously seen as inexistent elements of a society, rise up and overthrow the government. This forced those that were oppressed to resort to brutal violence. It pushed them to think the violence of thought, to decide and impose upon them something new; and rare that had both chance and eternity colliding together with each movement (Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, March 26^th, 2013).  This rising up of an element can be understood as a local mutation. A local mutation is when a multiple’s inexistent element appears with maximal value or the people of Paris who changed their degree of identity from invisible to visible (Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, March 26^th, 2013). This rising up allows a change to occur in the rigid structure of a transcendental. They force a change in the laws of a world. This alteration now allows a collective being or multiple to appear. This inexistent through its evental mutation has changed its status of appearing by being represented as a collective body or a primordial statement (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 83). I had called Badiou’s thought a militant thinking because in a sense it commands an affirmative existence, a working together; it demands a collective body to always work for the new. This is precisely why the Socratic corruption of the youth is so pertinent for Badiou because it is the youth that are always working towards the new, they are the new and it is often hard to break away from our mundane existence. Yet the call, calls out to a collective, it asks us all as bodies to participate as a body marching to the sound of liberation.

 

This is the risk of thought; it forces us to act and to actively participate in changing our surroundings. It demands of us to push the limits and in some cases to not have any limits at all. The corruption of the youth, the recklessness of thought and its violent imposition upon us represents a militant thinking. What militant thinking demands of the bodies that make this body are to accept the consequences of the event or the raising up which initiates the primordial statement into a ‘subjectivizable body’ or a united collective (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 89). This body rallied together by the authority of the primordial statement must simply declare allegiance to the statement and be a volunteer opening its arms to all the consequences (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 89).  This is what Badiou terms incorporation, a close affinity between all those bodies that now exist as one. It is this one that must move together in order to shatter the laws of appearing. Once a multiple is elevated to a maximal intensity it is incorporated in a truth-process, this is how a truth becomes a body and how a body of truth appears in a world. Incorporating oneself in a body is the giving up of oneself for this newly formed truth. This affinity allows one to not only have a part of this truth but it allows one to exist and appear at the same level of intensity as the primordial statement. The problem here is that one has to sacrifice their individuality for the collective and for truth. The subject must accept the consequences at all costs. This imposes on them to have faith in the movement and to the event.  Badiou imposes a rigid binary structure, either go back to the world of opinion that is consumed with bodies and languages or stay faithful to the event and remain hopeful in truths. Both scenarios leave no room for individual freedom for you’re either stuck in the realm of opinion or have faith in truths. The so called exception is simply another term for another structure to impose upon an individual.

 

How can thought demand of us to give ourselves up? How can we exist as a subject to truth and stay loyal to the event once it has vanished? Is the fidelity of an event enough to keep one whole? If an event vanishes after it climaxes why would one stay loyal and faithful to its very short existence only to go back to the way things were previously? Our enthusiasm and active fidelity as participants is supposed to be enough disrupt the laws of a world. A truth moves through a subject who has faith in an event linking them together, making the subject a part of an infinite process a truth and an immortal in that moment in time. The faithful subject with its collective body rallied by its incorporation represents a militant becoming (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 93).

 

Badiou doesn’t allow any other options. There is always a wager, a choice and a decision, and this type of radical choice represents the forced identity that we are to uphold. This time he erects a tripartite subjective map. We are either a faithful subject rallied together by a collective body/ incorporation, or we are a reactive subject. The reactive subject does not accept the event and its consequences, these subjects’s hold on to the previous world without the need to change anything, and those that fall into this type of subject will always distance themselves from those that follow the event, taking away the new transformation. This taking away represents a false present. The reactive subject will always try to place limits on the movement never allowing another rising up of an inexistent (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 94). The Obscure subject demands the destruction of the body of truth; it replaces the body of truth with a fictitious body. Its mode of expression is always an order of a God, race, or nation (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 95).

 

This Philosophy invokes its participants to be militants of a procedure. These militants are the faithful subjects armed with fidelity and the idea (Badiou, MetaPolitics p.142). The idea for Badiou is what sets the motion of an individual in the path of the true, thus an idea is supposed to mediate between an individual and a subject to truth (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 105). What we are left with is the violence of thought, that moment where we have to choose either incorporation as the faithful subject with truths, indifference and opinion as the reactive subject, or pure hostility and destruction as the obscure subject. It is that one more step that imposes on us that we must go on, we must decide and choose in favour of the true (Badiou, Second Manifesto of Philosophy, P. 67). What Badiou has forced on us, is the rigidity of thought based on arbitrary decision. Our decisions have consequences and if those consequences do not support the entire collective or fidelity to an event we fall back into the world of opinion. If philosophy is not reckless it is nothing and so we must strive for action and any form of inaction is to turn our back on the true. Therefore, the forcing of thought shocks people into action and only action can cause real change.

Bibliography

Badiou, Alain, and Norman Madarasz. Manifesto for Philosophy: followed by two essays: "The (Re)turn of philosophy itself" and "Definition of Philosophy". Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1999. Print.

 

Badiou, Alain, and Oliver Feltham. Being and Event. London: Continuum, 2007. Print.

 

Badiou, Alain. Logics of Worlds Being and Event, 2. London: Continuum, 2009. Print.

 

Badiou, Alain. Second Manifesto for Philosophy. English ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011. Print.

 

Badiou, Alain, and Jason Barker. Metapolitics. English-language ed. London: Verso, 2011/2005. Print.

 

Badiou, Alain, and Bruno Bosteels. Philosophy for Militants. London: Verso Books, 2012. Print.

 

Badiou, Alain. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. London: Verso, 2012. Print.

 

Hallward, Peter. Badiou: A Subject to Truth. Minneapolis, Minn. u.a.: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. Print.

 

Vernon, Jim: (Audio Lecture notes from Professor Vernon, March 26^th, 2013).